Events in natural language semantics are characterized in terms of regular languages, each string in which can be regarded as a temporal sequence of observations. The usual regular constructs (concatenation, etc.) are supplemented with superposition, inducing a useful notion of entailment, distinct from that given by models of predicate logic.
Introduction
Due in no small measure to [3] , events of some form or another have become a common tool in natural language semantics for analysing expressions of change [17, 11, 1] . For example, sentence (1) is taken to describe an event of Pat walking a mile, culminating in the past.
(1) Pat walked a mile.
Such events are formulated below as runs of machines that collectively constitute a causal order around which to explain temporality in natural language [20, 16] . Similar ideas have been developed in [14, 13, 21, 15, 19, 9] , 1 the distinctive feature of the present proposal being to collect modeltheoretically interpretable sequences of observations in regular languages, subject to an associative binary operation ² of 'superposition' that reveals temporal structure. The strings in the languages can be viewed as motion pictures (or comic strips), a logic for which can be constructed around ².
Consider, for instance, (1), a crude predicate logic translation of which is Ü´walk´Ô Üµ mile´Üµµ, abstracting away speech time (tense). Speech time or no speech time, the event described has a certain temporal structure. The un-inflected (tenseless) phrase 'Pat walk a mile' describes certain changes drawn out by the regular language (5) , which is the ²-superposition of (2), (3) and (4 1 Let us mention also the semantic automata of [2] . These accept languages very different from (and far simpler than) those considered here. Permutation invariance is tellingly inappropriate in the present applications -which, as discussed in the concluding paragraph below, concern essentially nonquantificational matters.
A symbol « in the regular languages above is a finite set ³ of formulas ³ , circumscribed by a box rather than the usual curly braces ¡ , to mark the use of a set-as-symbol, as opposed to setas-language. 2 The formulas inside a box are understood to hold simultaneously, with concatenation «¬ of boxes « and ¬ signifying that all formulas in ¬ hold at a temporal point that immediately succeeds one where all formulas in « hold. Relative to this notion of juxtaposition, we have the usual Kleene iteration « · «« £ . Thus, if we write £ for -as-symbol (and henceforth we will), then the regular expression «£ £ ¬ signifies that a temporal point described by ¬ comes after one described by «. Leaving the precise definition of superposition ² for section 2 (below), let us ask two questions. Is (5) anything more than an analysis by comics of (1), minus tense? Does the &-factorization (2)&(3)&(4) = (5) reveal any interesting temporal structure? Very briefly, it is claimed that the answer to both questions is 'yes' and that there are many other examples (with and without tense) that can be analysed along similar lines [7, 8] .
Staying with (1), the pictures (2)-(5) bear directly on a classification of events initiated by [22] (and refined in various directions since) to account for entailment patterns such as those illustated by (6)-(7).
(6) Pat walked for an hour.
Pat was walking Pat walked (7) Pat walked a mile in an hour.
Pat was walking a mile Pat walked a mile
The tenseless phrase 'Pat walk' describes a Vendlerian activity depicted in (8) which, like (2), has no definite terminating condition. Clearly, no formula ³ exists for which (2) or (8) is ³-telic. By contrast, (3) and (5) are walk´Ô Ñµ-telic. (7) exemplifies the widely accepted linguistic generalization that such telicity is associated with temporal 'in'-modification, and the so-called imperfective paradox [4] : -ing need not imply . On the other hand, if is an activity such as 'Pat walk' then -ing does imply , and temporal modification is expressed by 'for' rather than 'in'. These points can, as shown in Sections 2 and 3, be formulated in terms of superposition &, with entailments dropping out from the use of ² in linguistic composition (in a Davidsonian manner).
The logic involved is essentially propositional logic. The details are not complicated, but are worth spelling out to properly appreciate differences with more traditional approaches based on predicate logic or (Priorian) tense logic. To remove a formula ³ from a box ³ , we translate ³, as in tense logic, relative to an evaluation time to produce a formula interpretable in ordinary predicate logic (with time reified). But our regular languages may refer freely to time and temporal structure beyond an ordering, allowing us to capture phrases such as 'an hour' as (9) -or, for that matter, relations Ê between any finite number Ò of times, which (10) puts in increasing order for the sake of simplicity.
Moreover, we can capture some Priorian tense operators such as È, but not all -for instance, À, the universal dual of È, even though our regular languages are closed under a notion of negation. Kleene iteration stretches the temporal range of regular languages beyond any fixed number of temporal points, making them somewhat unlike the translations of tense formulas in predicate logic with distinguished evaluation times. All this is explained in Section 4, where relations with first-order logic are taken up. Insofar as transitive closure is not first-order, there is both more and less to our regular languages than first-order logic. It is comforting that entailment between our regular languages should, as detailed in Section 3 below, be so simple -perhaps deceptively so, given how easy it is to overlook the aforementioned differences. Connections with the situation calculus ( [12] ) are mentioned towards the end of Section 4.
Superposition and subsumption
Given a finite set¨of formulas and languages Ä Ä ¼ Pow´¨µ £ , let us define the superposition Ä²Ä ¼ of Ä and Ä ¼ to be the language 
The intuition is that ¦ consists of subsets of¨that can be observed/realized. Different subfamilies ¦ induce different notions of what is observable.
PROOF. Easy, with part (ii) a consequence of the closure of regular languages under intersection. Now, let us apply and ² ¦ to lines (1)- (8) in the introduction, under the assumption that the seẗ of formulas ³ is closed under negations ³ which ¦ respects according to (11) and (12) .
To characterize telicity, let us extract from a language Ä Pow´¨µ £ its set Ä 
. 4 Now, let us call Ä telic if Ä Ø Ð ´Äµ, where by definition,
Neither (2) nor (8) is telic, whereas both (3) and (5) (2) and (8) are iterative, whereas neither (3) nor (5) is. Next, writing Ä´È µ for the regular language we associate with the phrase È , let us suppose that 'in'-and 'for'-modification of a phrase by an interval Á are analysed according to
and that, as in (9), Ä´Áµ £ £ · £ (insuring that the interval Á has a middle as well as a beginning and end). As for the progressive, let us assume 
consider ¦ in the next section.
¦-completion, entailment and complements
The purpose of this section is to boost subsumption to a notion ¦ of entailment between languages (over the alphabet Pow´¨µ) implicit in a notion ¦ Pow´¨µ of consistency on¨. The basic tool is that of a ¦-completion Ä ¦ of a language Ä Pow´¨µ £ , formed from the set ¦ of -maximal
To relate ¦ to ¦ , it is useful (as the next proposition suggests) to form the ¦-complement of a language Ä, defined to be
(In writing ¦ Ä rather than ¦ Ä, I have opted for brevity over the clarity that perhaps favors the latter.)
The following are equivalent to Ä ¦ Ä ¼ . As for the -complement of a subfamily Pow´¨µ, it is useful to supplement lines (11)-(12) from the previous section with (13).
If ¦ satisfies (11)- (13), then for every Pow´¨µ, ¦ ¦ .
PROOF. A tedious but easy verification of and .
Model-theoretic interpretation
The present section interprets a language Ä over the alphabet Pow´¨µ in models of predicate logic.
Let us fix a set Î Ö of variables, a subset Î Ö Î Ö of which is designated temporal. (ii) for every sorted Å-assignment , we have Å iff Å Ä . 6 The th projection of a relation Ö is
Note that condition (i) has the consequence that the temporal variable Ü used in Å Ü × for × ¾ Ä does not occur freely anywhere in Ä (or ). 
The following lemma justifies the application of padded superposition in Ä above. [12] refers to as a situation over the propositional fluents ³ ¾¨inasmuch as´Å Ñ µ is a snapshot of Å at Ñ. Since ¦ fails to check for Å-chains, we cannot expect Å to co-incide exactly with ¦ , for nontrivial succ Å . ¦-completions are simply too crude to meet, on their own, the challenge the frame problem [12] poses for natural language [20] . At the very least, we might intersect Ä ¦ with some other language Ä that encodes constraints on succ,
An example of Ä above is uniq´Ø Ñ ´Üµµ, but there are far subtler inertial laws and inter-situational constraints to consider. We may well need to resort to more sophisticated tools such as forcing (explored in section 3 of [6] 
Conclusion
A slew of constructions on regular languages are introduced above, chief among which is superposition ², giving rise to an approximation of entailments ¦ based on ¦-completions Ä ¦ . In addition, we have negations and ¦ Ä, padding £ £ Ä£ £ , unpad, uniq´³µ and del´Ä ³µ, each of which is put to some model-theoretic use. What does all this machinery come to?
Consider the following passage from [20] .
The proposal is that the so-called temporal semantics of natural language is not primarily to do with time at all. Instead, the formal devices we need are those related to the representation of causality and goal-directed action.
It is not claimed that the present approach does full justice to the aforementioned proposal. Even so, it is fair to say that a form of causality is implicit in the state transitions of finite automata (accepting regular languages), and that the account of telicity in Section 2 gets at some notion of goal-directed action. As for the claim that temporal semantics is 'not primarily to do with time at all', let me return to the construal of the strings above as sequences of observations, distinct from some temporal reality that is presumably observed. While it is natural to interpret the relation symbols Ç and succ in Section 4 as bits of that temporal reality, these bits are of interest only to the extent that they throw light on the strings of observations. Nor is anything made of finite automata beyond the regular languages they accept. 9 A language offers only a faint trace of a machine that accepts/generates it, of which there may be any number. And while there is considerable scientific interest in identifying the computational mechanism underlying natural language, my own ignorance inclines me towards more modest goals. An abstract stance may have limited predictive power, but it also has a better chance of getting something right (the step from procedural to declarative semantics gaining us, with any luck, simplicity and clarity).
There is a further sense in which the system of observations above is of bounded scope. And that has to do with the persistence of Ú´¨µ-formulas that can be portrayed (according to Proposition 4.3), and indeed are portrayed (according to Theorem 4.2 and Proposition 4.4). What about the non-persistent formulas of predicate logic? The present finite-state approach was, in fact, conceived as a complement, at what [17] calls the 'sub-atomic' level, to a more wide-ranging model-theoretic re-interpretation of propositions-as-types (applied to natural language discourse in [18] ). That is, beyond the sub-atomic realm of regular languages wait typed -calculi (functional programming). Should events, as observations, be equated with objects that are observed? For a perspective that instead links events with proofs, the interested reader is referred to the constructive eventuality assumption in [5] .
